Water Law Review
Volume 6

Issue 2

Article 35

1-1-2003

Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2003)
Karen L. Golan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Karen L. Golan, Court Report, Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2003), 6 U. Denv. Water L. Rev.
616 (2003).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

flowing in defined channels, initiated after 1914. As Long did not
specify when Great Spring initiated the appropriation, he did not
demonstrate the necessity of a permit.
In the court's view, Long improperly invoked the public trust
doctrine as a basis for his unfair competition claim. The public trust
doctrine protects specific public interests in navigable waters and
nonnavigable waters (to the extent any diversion affects navigable
waters).
However, Long never alleged Great Spring's extraction
affected navigable waters or any interest protected by the public trust
doctrine.
Long also claimed Great Spring's extraction of water held in the
public trust violated the California Constitution's reasonable use
doctrine, which mandates the prevention of waste and unreasonable
use of water. Under the doctrine, a use is considered unreasonable if
it injures a competing use. Despite claiming Great Spring's extraction
depleted a scarce public resource, Long's claim was deficient because
he did not allege that the use harmed competing users.
Last, the court addressed Long's claims the SWRCB breached it
duties by allowing Great Spring's unreasonable use of water, thereby
wasting taxpayer funds. Long sought a court order declaring the
SWRCB's actions unlawful and directing it to enjoin Great Spring,
conduct an investigation, and make conclusions of facts and law. He
also sought the return of any funds due to the SWRCB for the use of
the water. Long based these claims on Civil Procedure Code section
526(a), which permits taxpayer suits against state officials to prevent
waste or illegal use of state funds or property. However, these taxpayer
suits may not be employed to compel discretionary agency action.
Relying on the plain language of the Water Code, the court concluded
Long was seeking to order the SWRCB to undertake discretionary
action. For this reason, Long's taxpayer suit did not state permissible
claims against the SWRCB. Thus, the court upheld the dismissal of
Long's claims against the SWRCB.
Arthur R. Kleven

COLORADO
Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2003) (certifying that
continued migration and ongoing presence of toxic pollution on a
landowner's property constituted a continuing trespass and nuisance
for as long as the pollution existed without removal or abatement by
the egregious party, even if the condition causing the pollution has
ceased).
Robert Hoery brought suit against the United States in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado under the Federal
Torts Claim Act for continued trespass and nuisance caused by release
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of trichlorethylene ("TCE") and other toxic chemicals from the Lowry
Air Force Base into the ground which caused contamination of his
nearby property. While the United States ceased all use of TCE at
Lowry in 1994, TCE still remained on Hoery's property and continued
to enter his land and groundwater daily. The court dismissed the case
because the release of TCE ended in 1994, and determined the
nuisance and trespass on Hoery's land was limited to the actual release
of TCE and was, therefore, not continuous. Hoery appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Because of
lacking controlling precedent, the Tenth Circuit certified to the
Colorado Supreme Court the question of whether the continued
migration and ongoing presence of toxic chemicals on Hoery's
property caused by releases made by the United States constituted a
continuing trespass and nuisance under Colorado law. The court held
that continuous migration and presence of toxic chemicals on Hoery's
land, due to the United States' failure to abate or remove the
chemicals, constituted a continuous trespass and nuisance under
Colorado law.
In 1993 Hoery acquired a residence served by a groundwater well
in a Denver neighborhood. Hoery's well was located seven blocks
north of Lowry Air Force Base. The United States operated Lowry as
an active military base beginning in the 1940s and ceased operations in
September 1994. During its operation, the United States dumped
TCE and other chemicals at Lowry. These releases created plumes of
toxic pollution extending many miles north of Lowry. In 1997, testing
conducted by the United States showed that TCE contaminated
Hoery's well.
The Colorado Supreme Court first determined that the harm
caused by the release of TCE by the United States constituted a
continuous tort rather than a permanent tort under Colorado law.
The importance of making this distinction related to when the statute
of limitation began to run-a permanent tort claim accrues at the time
the harm took place, conversely, a continuous tort claim only accrues
once the harmful condition is removed. The court found that
Colorado law recognizes continuing trespass and nuisance for
invasions of property where the egregious party fails to stop or remove
a wrongfully placed invasion on the property. The only exception to
this rule applies to irrigation ditches or a railway line, classified as
permanent torts.
The court determined that the contamination constituted a
continuing trespass and nuisance even though the condition causing
the contamination had ceased. Because this was an issue of first
impression, the court applied the reasoning from the Ninth Circuit
case, Arcade Water Dist. v. United States, which stated that the most
important factor to consider is presence of continued contamination
on the property, not whether the contamination source ceased to
pollute. TCE remained on Hoery's property regardless of the fact that
the use of TCE ceased. Therefore, because the United States failed to
remove the TCE, a continuous invasion remained. In addition, the

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

court reasoned that the TCE continued to migrate onto Hoery's
property, and the failure to prevent the pollution plume also
constituted a continuing property invasion.
So long as these
continuing property invasions remained, the court stated that it was
immaterial whether the United States continued to release TCE. The
court thus affirmatively certified that migration and ongoing presence
of toxic chemicals, regardless of whether the pollution has ceased,
constitutes a continuing trespass or nuisance under Colorado law.
Karen L. Golan

CONNECTICUT
Agnello v. Urbano, No. CV000273689S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS
3421 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2002) (holding that abutters cannot
divert surface water onto the adjacent landowner's property; that
abutters cannot interfere with an express, implied, or prescriptive
easement; and that interference with an easement reasonably
necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of property is trespass).
Joseph and Sharon Agnello filed a six-count complaint against
Armando and Maria Urbano, the adjacent property owner, in the
Superior Court of Connecticut at New Haven.
The complaint
addressed three main issues: (1) whether Urbano diverted surface
water onto Agnello's property; (2) which owner possessed title to a
triangular area of land; and (3) Agnello's easement rights. Urbano
filed a counterclaim, which sought to quiet title and alleged Agnello
trespassed on his property. The court found in favor of Agnello on all
counts.
Agnello and Urbano owned adjacent properties. A twenty-five foot
right-of-way provided access to Agnello's property. In 1999, Urbano
removed a split rail fence located on the adjacent property and
constructed a new fence. In addition, Urbano placed materials in the
right-of-way, which deprived Agnello of access and constructed a
cinder block wall in order to divert surface water onto Agnello's land.
Agnello requested and received a temporary restraining order before
trial. The order prevented Urbano from diverting the water onto
Agnello's land and from interfering with the right-of-way access.
Urbano violated the order by building various barriers and limiting the
right-of-way.
First, the court addressed whether Urbano wrongfully diverted
surface water. The court applied the test formulated in Tide Water Oil
Sales Corp. v. Shimelman, which states, "the landowner, in dealing with
surface water, is entitled to take only such steps as are reasonable."
Accordingly, the court held Urbano improved his land and caused the
water to impermissibly flow on to Agnello's land. The court further

